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Is the Spanish economy positioned at its optimal 
progressivity level in personal income tax? This article 
quantifies the aggregate, distributional, and welfare 
consequences of moving toward such an optimal level. A 
heterogeneous households general equilibrium model 
featuring both life cycle and dynastic elements is calibrated 
to replicate some characteristics of the Spanish economy 
and used to evaluate potential reforms of the tax system. 
The findings suggest that increasing progressivity would 
be optimal, even though it would involve an efficiency loss. 
The optimal reform of the tax schedule would reduce 
wealth and income inequality at the cost of negative effects 
on capital, labor, and output. Finally, these theoretical 
results are evaluated using tax microdata and describe a 
current scenario where the income-top households 
typically face suboptimal effective average tax rates.
Many modern governments implement a redistributive fiscal 
policy, where personal income is taxed at an increasingly 
higher rate, while transfers tend to target the poorest 
households. The taxation of personal income is not a minor 
issue, since most of the OECD economies obtain a large 
proportion of their tax collection through it.1 Raising taxes on 
higher incomes may be potentially justified by the increase in 
income and wealth inequality in recent years in Spain, 
especially after the 2007 crisis, as documented by Angel et 
al. (2018). Beforehand, one is likely to consider that raising 
taxes on the income-rich households could reverse the 
growing concentration at the top. However, this type of policy 
could be very costly in terms of efficiency in advanced market 
1  The OECD average of the share of personal income tax 
revenues over total tax revenues (excluding social security 
contributions) has been around 30-35% in recent years.
economies. For that reason, the optimal design of a 
redistributive tax system is subject to many constraints, as 
argued by Bakis et al. (2015). This is why having a 
quantitative theory that accounts accurately for the observed 
income and wealth inequality is crucial when assessing the 
aggregate, distributional, and welfare implications of certain 
policies. For that purpose, a heterogeneous households 
general equilibrium model is here calibrated to replicate 
some characteristics of the Spanish economy and used to 
compare the steady-state consequences of setting an 
optimal progressivity level in the Spanish personal income 
tax. This frames the setup here presented in literature of 
general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents to 
explore the relationship between fiscal policy variables and 
the endogenous cross-sectional distribution of income 
and wealth in Spain. Examples of this body of literature are 
Pijoan-Mas and González-Torrabadella (2006), Díaz-
Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2019), and Guner et al. (2020), 
among others.
The theoretical framework of this paper is built for Spain 
following Castañeda et al. (2003). The model is devoted to 
(i) account for income and wealth inequality and (ii) study 
decisions of households that face labor income processes 
that are random, household-specific, and uninsurable. In 
these model-based economies, households accumulate 
wealth in part to smooth their consumption. Heterogeneity 
is introduced in this setup via distinct labor market 
opportunities using an uninsurable process on the 
endowment of efficiency labor units that features non-linear 
dynamics. Given the labor market opportunity, the 
households choose their work effort. In other words, 
the labor choice is set here to be endogenous. Life cycle 
characteristics are modeled using aging and retirement and 
dynastic links are modeled in a way that households are 
altruistic toward their descendants (hybrid model with 
retirement and bequests). Household face a progressive tax 
schedule modeled through the Heathcote et al. (2017) 
specification, a function that allows for assessing average 
level of taxes and progressivity separately. The model is 
properly calibrated to match some empirical statistics of the 
Spanish economy and replicates the distributions of income 
and wealth in very much detail (also at the very top tails of 
those distributions). 
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Once the theoretical framework is defined, a bunch of potential 
progressivity reforms are assessed through the calculation of 
many different general equilibria (one equilibrium for each 
degree of progressivity evaluated). Then a Benthamite social 
planner, who takes into account all households in the economy 
by putting the same weight on each of them, discerns the 
optimal progressivity reform that leaves the aggregate tax 
burden and transfers-to-output levels unchanged. The findings 
suggest that aggregate social welfare is maximized when the 
level of progressivity of the Spanish personal income tax is 
increased to some extent. More precisely, in the optimally 
reformed scenario (setting the optimal level of progressivity), 
welfare gains are equivalent to an average increase of 3.08% 
of consumption.
By decomposing the aggregate welfare change, it is shown 
that most of the welfare gains are obtained from a majority of 
households facing a lower tax rate, i.e. the poorest households 
facing lower effective income tax rates and richest households 
affronting higher effective income tax rates. On the contrary, 
the general equilibrium effects of the optimal reformed 
economy (higher interest rate and lower wage) and the effects 
resulting from changes in the equilibrium distribution of 
households across income levels (larger mass of households 
at lower income levels) show a welfare loss, but these losses 
are so small that together cannot overpass the welfare gains 
directly coming from the reformed tax system, jointly resulting 
in positive aggregate welfare changes. These welfare gains are 
decomposed by household type, where it is observed that the 
poorest working and non-working households are the ones 
who benefit the most from the reform. Contrarily, the most 
efficient working households and the wealthiest ones (either 
working or non-working) are those who experience the largest 
trade-off between (i) positive welfare effects derived from higher 
income (due to an increased interest rate that pushes up 
capital returns) and (ii) adverse effects emerging from higher 
tax payments (due to the increase in progressivity of the 
income tax that discourages labor and savings). The losses 
from this trade-off are particularly high in top parts of the 
income and wealth distributions and clearly offset the potential 
welfare gains of the households populating such areas. 
Therefore, knowing that these agents would be the losers 
of the reform, despite positive aggregate welfare effects, 
the consequences on aggregate capital, labor, and 
output would be negative, which means that the economy 
would experience an efficiency loss. Moreover, looking at 
the distributional implications, this reform would reduce 
income and wealth inequality.
Finally, the theoretical results are evaluated with Spanish tax 
micro data. From the point of view of a Benthamite social 
planner, households between the 20th and the 80th 
percentiles would experience a decrease in their average tax 
rates under the optimal progressivity reform. For example, 
the effective average tax rate encountered by a household 
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income distribution would drop from 0.067 to 0.056, which 
involves a change of 1.1 p.p.. On the other hand, households 
above the 80th percentile would experience a drastic increment 
in their effective average tax rate. For instance, the top 1% 
households of the gross income distribution would go from 
confronting an average tax rate of 0.284 in the actual scenario 
to dealing with an average tax rate of 0.330 in the optimal one.
In conclusion, as policy implications arising from this 
study, what the model (jointly with the data) indicates is 
that, in terms of aggregate welfare, it would be optimal to 
increase the progressivity of the personal income tax. In 
addition, the reform would reduce income and wealth 
inequality. However, this would lead to an efficiency loss 
of the economy, since it discourages work and savings 
mainly by penalizing the top-working and wealthiest 
households.
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